Saturday, February 22, 2014

Operation JAWBREAKER: Lessons Learned

What follows is a group project I led at Georgia Tech (Fall 2012) in my War in the 21st C class taught my Dr. Michael Salomone. I've pasted it in from an annotated briefing format.



Sep 11, 2001 - Tora Bora, Dec 2001

Table of Contents 

The Assignment - Operation JAWBREAKER -------------------------------------------------- 3

Research Design - First Hand Accounts ------------------------------------------------------- 5  

Transferable Lessons -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7

1) Build long-term relationships ---------------------------------------------------------------- 8

    - Built Intelligence Infrastructure

    - Return on Investment When OBL Moves to Afghanistan

    - Timeline of early CIA Involvement in Afghanistan

2) Utilize existing infrastructure --------------------------------------------------------------- 13

    - Integration - Successes

Collaborative Combines Arms Efforts

        Intelligence and Information

    - Case Study - Battle of Tora Bora

3) Emphasize field assessments --------------------------------------------------------------- 19

    - Field Assessment - Operatives in Afghanistan

    - Assessment in Washington, DC

    - Consequences of Contradictions  

Bibliography ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 29


The Assignment

“Gary, I want you to take a small team of CIA officers into Afghanistan. You will link up with the Northern Alliance in the Panjshir Valley, and your job is to convince them to cooperate fully with the CIA and the US military as we go after bin Laden and the al-Qa’ida.

- CTC chief Cofer Black (Schroen 16)

Operation JAWBREAKER was the first team sent into Afghanistan In response to the 9/11 attacks. Comprised of CIA operatives and Special Forces teams, JAWBREAKER's mission was to find and eliminate Osama bin Laden and his Lieutenants. 

    JAWBREAKER's first task was to make contact with Northern Alliance forces still recovering from the Sep 9, 2001 assassination of their leader Ahmad Shah Masood in the Panjshir Valley. After verifying the Northern Alliance leadership infrastructure was still in tact, the JAWBREAKER team would be tasked with integrating American objectives with that of their Afghan allies. Northern Alliance military commanders would assist the JAWBREAKER team in plotting GPS coordinates of Taliban targets, US Airstrikes would be called in, and Northern Alliance infantry would consolidate positions. These coordinated efforts were to culminate in destroying Osama bin Laden's terrorist network.  

    This stage of American operations in Afghanistan culminated in the Dec 2001 Battle of Tora Bora. Tora Bora is a cave complex located in the White Mountains of Eastern Afghanistan near the Khyber Pass and the Pakistan border. A battle ensued when the US and its allies received intelligence reports that Osama bin Laden was hiding in the Tora Bora caves. However, Osama bin Laden was able to evade capture and escaped into Pakistan. It would not be until May 2011 - almost ten years later - that Osama bin Laden was found and killed by US Special Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan.  

Research Design - Investigate First Hand Accounts

"We don't know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001. Some intelligence sources said he was; others indicated he was in Pakistan at the time...Tora Bora was teeming with Taliban and Qaeda operatives ... but Mr. bin Laden was never within our grasp."
- Gen. Tommy Franks, Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. "War of Words." New York Times, 2004

“[A] severe and fierce bombardment began...not one second passed without warplanes hovering over our heads...[America] exhausted all efforts to blow up and annihilate this tiny spot – wiping it out altogether...Despite all this, we blocked their daily attacks, sending them back defeated, bearing their dead and wounded. And not once did American forces dare storm our position.”
- Osama bin Laden, qtd. by Raymond Ibrahim in The al-Qaeda Reader, 2007. pg. 245
As university students, the resources available to us to investigate Fall 2001 covert operations in Afghanistan are limited. Our approach was to sift through the available first-hand accounts published in books and newspapers as well as transcripts from Congressional hearings.
We've largely relied in CIA operatives Gary C. Schroen's and Gary Berntsen's accounts as found in "First In: An insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan" as well as "JAWBREAKER The Attack on Bin Laden and Al - Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander" respectively. 
The quotes from the previous slides relating to the Battle of Tora Bora provide insight into the fallibility of first hand accounts as each of these speakers might have  political motives to say what they did.  While it was in Osama bin Laden's best interest to belittle American military prowess in the face of Taliban commitment to the cause, General Tommy Franks was quite possibly motivated in his New York Times Op-Ed  by the upcoming 2004 US Presidential election between George W. Bush and Sen. John Kerry. Indeed, General Franks had attended the same high school as First Lady Laura Bush in West Texas and was an outspoken supporter of the Bush campaign.  

Transferable Lessons

Future intelligence-heavy operations might benefit from the following lessons learned from Operation JAWBREAKER:


1) Build long-term relationships

2) Utilize existing infrastructure

3) Emphasize field assessments


After piecing together the events comprising Operation JAWBREAKER and analyzing what was effective as well as what could have been done differently, three transferable lessons have emerged. 

    The first lesson was how the Operation benefitted from the CIA's long-term relationship with the Ahmad Shah Masood's Northern Alliance. CIA involvement in the region dates back to the early 1970's and before the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Agency had already recruited assets in all seven Mujahedin groups. In early 1980 a young Tajik military commander named Masood declared Jihad on the Communists and the CIA recognised in him a long-term partner. In 1996, Osama bin Laden relocated to Afghanistan and when it was determined he had been responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the CIA already had contacts in the region with which to collaborate in pursuing a counteroffensive. 
    Secondly, the Operation exemplifies the value in utilizing existing military infrastructures. The JAWBREAKER team was able to benefit from capable Northern Alliance military commanders who were in command of a large infantry familiar with Afghan terrain. However, the Battle of Tora Bora serves as a case study as to the limitations that should be placed on collaboration. 
    Finally, Operation JAWBREAKER exemplifies the need for decision-makers to emphasize field assessments in their deliberations. The JAWBREAKER team had formulated a realistic plan to quickly defeat the Taliban but this was ignored due to bureaucratic debates over the propriety of having Tajiks conquer Kabul.

 1) Build Long-Term Relationships

Built Intelligence Infrastructure

“Now gentlemen, I'm here to get things started. Our people in Kabul can't do much, hemmed in by the regime as they are. But the Mujahedin, they have representatives here in Pakistan, in Peshawar, and here in Islamabad. This is where our fight will begin. You will recruit assets in every major Mujahedin group. I want to know what they are doing, how their fight is going. I want to know what they need, how we can help them. I want action. I want results!”

-Alan Wolfe, Chief of CIA's Near East/South Asia Division, Late 1978  (Schroen 46) 

Return on  Investment:  OBL Arrives in Afghanistan

“In May 1996, bin Laden, under intense U.S.pressure, had been forced to shift his base of operations from Sudan. Bin Laden's previous activities in Afghanistan made it the logical choice for his next sanctuary. Upon arrival in the country he was initially hosted by such fundamentalist Mujahedin leaders as Professor Sayyaf and Yunis Khalis. It was not long, however, before bin Laden’s Jihad credentials, his anti-Western stance, and his large checkbook attracted the interest of Mullah Omar, who soon welcomed bin Laden as an honored guest.”
-Gary Schroen (Schroen 60)

JAWBREAKER team leader, Gary Schroen, placed CIA activity in Afghanistan in its historical context,

“The events that led to CIA’s involvement in Afghanistan really began in 1973, when Mohammed Daoud, a cousin of King Zahir Shah, leading a coalition of Muslim radicals and some communists, succeeded in forcing King Zahir Shah off the throne and into exile in Rome. For the Soviet Union, this was a golden opportunity to extend its influence into Afghanistan, another step in the centuries-long ‘Great Game’ - the struggle by the Soviets to push their influence and control deeper into the old British Indian Empire.” (Schroen  43)
    Also, Mr. Schroen illustrated the return on investment gained from the relationship the CIA pursued with the Mujahedin and Afghan tribal leaders when, (1) the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and (2) OBL reentered the country in 1996. In both instances, organisations known to be hostile to US interests moved into Afghanistan only to find that the CIA had already built an intelligence gathering infrastructure in the region.

    The first quote is taken from Alan Wolfe in late 1978, then the chief of the CIA's Near East/South Asia Division, as he outlined Agency strategy to build an intelligence infrastructure in Afghanistan. By mid 1979, the CIA had recruited assets in all seven Mujahedin group and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan followed on Christmas Eve 1979. In the second,Mr. Schroen described Osama bin Laden's 1996 re-entry into Afghanistan and subsequent assimilation into the Mujahedin infrastructure.


1) Build Long-Term Relationships

Early CIA Involvement in Afghanistan (1973- )

  • Early 1980 - Ahmad Shah Masood declared Jihad on the Communists and took group into Panshir Valley; this marked the beginning of the Northern Alliance
  • Summer 1988 - USSR was defeated which prompted closing of US Kabul Embassy; it would not reopen until 15 Dec 2001
  • April 1992 - Najibullah regime fell in to Masood’s Tajik forces
  • May 1996 - OBL forced to leave Sudan, Afghanistan was a natural place for him to go
  • Sep 1996 - Taliban took Kabul
  • Sep 9, 2001 - Masood Assassinated
  • Sep 11, 2001 - 9/11 attacks
  • Sep 26-28, 2001 - JAWBREAKER team met with Northern Alliance leaders, found infrastructure still in tact 
Source: Schroen, Gary C. First In. New York: Random House, Inc. 2005.

 This timeline details the relationship the CIA pursued with Ahmad Shah Masood's Northern Alliance beginning in early 1980 when he declared Jihad on the Soviet Union. By 1988 the Soviet Union had been defeated and in April 1992, the Najibullah regime fell to Masood’s Tajik forces. Osama bin Laden re entered Afghanistan in May 1996 and in September of the same year, the Taliban took Kabul. 
    The Agency maintained their relationship with Masood and his Northern Alliance until September 9, 2001 when Masood was assassinated by a suicide bomber. When it was learned that Afghanistan-based Osama bin Laden had been responsible for the 9/11 attacks against the United States, the agency knew immediately how to proceed. Upon entry into Afghanistan, the JAWBREAKER team's first assignment was to assess whether or not the Northern Alliance had retained its infrastructure in the aftermath of Masood's death. The Northern Alliance infrastructure was indeed still in tact and the JAWBREAKER team was able to begin a collaborative effort to locate Osama bin Laden and his Lieutenants.  

2) Utilize existing infrastructure 

Integration Successes

Collaborative Combined Arms Efforts

"The combined effect of the 'death ray' as General Dostum called the laser designator and U.S. air strikes was phenomenal. One Taliban bunker after another... was obliterated. The Taliban literally didn't know what had hit them. Seconds after the bombs fell, General Dostum and his cavalry would charge with AK-47s blazing like the hordes of Genghis Khan."
- Jawbreaker, "Mazar-e Sharif" (Berntsen 135)

 Intelligence and Information

“[The] battlefield was a strange place. When there was no active fighting, individuals on either side would simply walk across the lines to visit with friends and family on the other side... This made it real easy to run spies into one another’s territory. Once our Northern Alliance partners got the hang of the Dari Language GPSs, we could start sending them into Kabul to mark the geo-cords of Taliban buildings and military units. When they returned, we would debrief our sources, retrieve the geo-cords, then bomb the Taliban targets into oblivion.”
- Jawbreaker, "Panshir Valley" (Berntsen 110)

Collaborative Combined Arms Efforts:

While the Northern Alliance (NA) provided the overwhelming majority of the ground troops, the U.S. made use of its technological prowess through the usage of laser-designated guidance systems and GPS satellites, which laid the groundwork for precision airstrikes.
For example, at Mazar-e Sharif, fighting alongside NA Generals Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mohammad Atta, the U.S. made use of a collaborative strike strategy to great effect. Specifically, the U.S. and NA worked together to mark Taliban targets using handheld GPS units. The U.S. made extensive use of its air strike capabilities using F-16s, B-1s, and B-52s with both precision guided and iron bombs, while AC-130 gunships provided close air support. Also, very small numbers of U.S. Special Forces units and CIA Special Operations Group personnel were involved in the battle. They were instructed not to directly engage the Taliban positions and instead only to call in air strikes for geopolitical reasons.
While the U.S. Air Force was bombing the Taliban positions, the NA Infantry and Cavalry units rode in and eliminated or captured retreating Taliban, Arab, and foreign  fighters gaining control of  land previously held by the Taliban. It is interesting to note that the cavalry units used by the NA were a mixture of pickup truck mounted units and traditional horse mounted units with the horse mounted cavalry forming the bulk of their cavalry units.  

Intelligence and Information:

By integrating their intelligence-gathering efforts, the U.S. and the NA were able to take advantage of their individual strengths in the theater. The NA had better and more extensive human intelligence sources on the ground. Beyond the ability to send spies, NA personnel often had contacts, such as friends and family members, in the Taliban or Taliban controlled regions and greater knowledge of hazards, such as mined roads, than the U.S. forces in the region.

2) Utilize existing infrastructure

Integration - Questionable Successes

Operational Issues Despite the often-effective partnership, operational issues plagued both the U.S. and the Northern Alliance, including:  

  • Insufficient resources: in preliminary discussions with Gen. Franks, NA leader Gen. Fahim claimed that his men desperately needed food, fuel, weapons, and uniforms
  • Transportation: the Afghans provided almost no vehicles to the Panshir Valley team because of their distance from the front lines 

In the 40 days I was in the Panjshir Valley, I spent $5 million, the vast majority passed to our Afghan allies for their use, with only a small amount used as payment for essential supplies and equipment that the team required.”

- Gary Schroen (Schroen 94) 

Operational Issues:

In many respects, the CIA and Special Operations forces were able to forge an effective partnership with the Northern Alliance that took advantage of both groups' capabilities. However, there was a reason the Northern Alliance had not wrested control of Afghanistan from the Taliban. NA troops were poorly equipped and lacking in basic resources, while Taliban forces were superior in both numbers and weaponry.
U.S. airstrikes helped to make up for the Taliban's numerical superiority, but the Afghans on the ground still needed supplies. The result was that the U.S. spent a great deal of time, effort, and money on simply helping NA officers satisfy the basic needs of their troops.

2) Utilize existing infrastructure

Integration - Failures                   
Case Study: Battle of Tora Bora

Motivation to Fight:

The desire to take back the country from the Taliban made the U.S.-NA coalition a natural fit. Additionally, some key Northern Alliance leaders, particularly General Fahim, had political ambitions that fueled their desire to work with the U.S. But there was no such motivation for the Afghans when the U.S. turned its focus to capturing bin Laden, which had no tangible benefit for the NA allies since bin Laden had financially supported many rural Afghans in the North Eastern part of the country.
In addition, many analysts believe that the Battle of Tora Bora would have ended more favorably for the United States had US soldiers conducted the assault on the cave complex. The terrain in the mountains was rugged and would have presented a challenge to U.S. forces that might have resulted in increased casualties. Still, the U.S. would have had well-equipped and well-supplied troops committed to the engagement. The Afghan militias and Pakistani forces called upon at Tora Bora were notoriously unreliable, and their unwillingness to endure the tough conditions led to the ultimate failure to capture bin Laden. 

Policy Decisions:

The decision to keep U.S. troops on the sidelines and rely on a combination of CIA and Special Operations forces was  made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld based on fears that sending too many troops would provoke a response from anti-U.S. groups in the region. Because of Rumsfeld's unwillingness and refusal to commit sufficient ground forces, the U.S. would rely heavily on the Northern Alliance for any operations that required a substantial presence on the ground. This reliance on the Northern Alliance presented a number of problems from an operational standpoint. While this decision may have appeared politically astute in the short term, its ramifications are far reaching and would forever change the outcome of the war in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror.
One of the most glaring examples of the impact of the Rumsfeld/Franks "light footprint" approach, and high command's refusal to break from this strategy, was that there was not a substantial U.S. troop presence on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Pakistani Frontier Corps was unable and more likely uninterested in blocking the border in the mountains of Tora Bora, allowing Osama bin Laden to evade capture and escape into Pakistan.

3) Emphasize Field Assessments

- Field Assessments from Operatives in Afghanistan

- Political Calculations in Washington, DC

- Consequences of Lack of Emphasis on Field Assessments

 “Over the several days following the Takhar front GPS survey, we began to sense that the bombing strategy was not as clear-cut or sharply defined back in Washington as it was to us sitting in Panshir.” (Schroen 153)
- Gary Schroen

3) Emphasize Field Assessments

The entire operation was characterised by a discrepancy in the strategies outlined by the JAWBREAKER team and the political calculations made by those in Washington, DC.

 Specifically, the JAWBREAKER team had formulated a realistic plan to quickly defeat the Taliban by coordinating a bombing campaign of Taliban front lines. The primary of objective of this plan was to eliminate Osama bin Laden and his Lieutenants as quickly as possible and thereby to put an end to the Taliban threat.   

However, this plan was stymied by long term political concerns regarding US - Pakistan relations and the propriety of Northern Alliance Tajik troops capturing Kabul. Those in Washington, DC calculated that the best way to ensure long term stability in the region was to keep the Northern Alliance in place and to build up Pashtun resistance in the south.  


3) Emphasize Field Assessments

North East region of Afghanistan under Northern Alliance control


3) Emphasize Field Assessments

North East region of Afghanistan under Northern Alliance control

This map is an interpretation of the JAWBREAKER team leader's description of Northern Alliance territory, specifically : 

“On a map it was as if the large letter L had been drawn, isolating the northern corner of the country, with the Panshir Valley forming the heart of that block of territory. The Northern Alliance forces, about 8,000 fighters were deployed in static positions in lines opposite those of the Taliban forces... Taliban frontline positions offered a clearly defined, target-rich environment made to order for US airpower to strike.” (Schroen 106)
- Gary Schroen 

    It is important to note that both Northern Alliance and Taliban front lines were clearly defined, and therefore it would certainly have been possible to conduct a crippling bombing campaign. Also, notice the close proximity of both Kabul and Pakistan to Northern Alliance territory.

3) Emphasize Field Assessments

Field Assessment - Operatives in Afghanistan   

Bomb the Taliban's front lines, then Allow the Northern Alliance to take over Kabul. 


"I was convinced that a concentrated bombing campaign on the Taliban lines would be devastating to the morale and effectiveness of the Taliban and Arab troops... Heavy casualties, continuing for days on end, would break the Taliban troops.” (Schroen 106) 

Strategic Targeting

"The Taliban military was not conventionally structured. They did not have an infrastructure to strike. Bombing fixed military targets such as supply depots, vehicle repair facilities, and rear-area military installations would have little to no impact on the Taliban forces massed in the north facing the Northern Alliance."  (Schroen 154)

End Game

"Aref's officers had extensive contacts with commanders serving under the Taliban in the lines above Kabul. Their loyalty to the Taliban was superficial, based on local circumstances... Once the U.S. bombings of Taliban positions began...Their loyalties would weaken, and an attractive cash offer to switch sides might case many of those fence sitting commanders to defect to the Northern Alliance." (Schroen 158)

3) Emphasize Field Assessments

Field Assessment - Operatives in Afghanistan  

These quotes are taken from the JAWBREAKER team leader, Gary Schroen, and they illustrate three different components of his strategy.

The first component of the bombing strategy was targeted at Taliban morale. First In discussed in great detail the relative lack of combat training enjoyed by Afghan soldiers to that of their Tajik and American counterparts. Taliban troops were known to fire their guns without aiming for theological reasons, namely that God would carry the bullets where they needed to go.

    Next, Mr. Schroen outlined the strategic reasons to bomb Taliban front lines rather than fixed installations. As the Taliban military was not conventionally structured, there were no nerve centers or fixed installations  whose destruction would have a large impact on operational capability.

    Finally, Mr. Schroen outlined an end-game for US operations in Afghanistan that capitalized on the extensive contacts Northern Alliance leaders shared with Taliban personnel. Mr. Schroen calculated that after a relentless bombardment of Taliban front lines, enemy soldiers could be persuaded to defect.

    Mr. Schroen relayed his assessment to Washington, DC decision makers on several occasions but his pleas for bombing Taliban front lines were largely dismissed.  

3) Emphasize Field Assessments

Decision Makers Assessment - Washington, DC

Keep Northern Alliance in Place

“Our chief in Islamabad was loudly beating what I thought of as the Pakistani drum song - that focusing on the north and concentrating our military efforts against the Taliban forces there would allow the Tajik Northern Alliance to capture Kabul and sweep across the northern half of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns would be left behind, still fragmented and militarily weak, which would embolden the Tajiks to press into Pashtun areas to gain political advantage and settle old scores even before the Taliban were overthrown. This theme played well in some circles within Washington, especially at the Department of State and some offices of the National Security Council." (Schroen 154) 

Build Pashtun Capabilities in the South

"But if the Northern Alliance were held in place, we would focus on building Pashtun capabilities in the South. At the same time, we could weaken the Taliban with strategic bombing against their fixed military infrastructure. Then, in some weeks, when the CIA had the opportunity to rally Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, we could begin to coordinate a nation-wide bombing campaign. This would allow the Pashtuns a better opportunity to compete for a post-Taliban political position.”  (Schroen 154) 

3) Emphasize Field Assessments

Decision Makers Assessment - Washington, DC

Washington, DC decision-makers  contorted military strategy around long term political contingencies. 
In the first quote, Mr. Schroen referred to  "the Pakistani war drum" or US - Pakistan relations. Some in Washington were concerned that unilateral support of the Tajik Northern Alliance would damage long term US interests in the region as Pakistan had long opposed Masood's Tajik army. Indeed, Pakistan occupies an important geostrategic position as it borders India, China, and Iran as well as Afghanistan. The US and Pakistan had worked together to support the Mujahidin and Pakistan agreed to assist the US in apprehending Osama bin Laden following the 9/11 attacks.  Another dynamic of Pakistani involvement in Operation JAWBREAKER is that Pakistani officials consulted their allies in Beijing before agreeing to assist the United States. 

Given these political objectives, Washington DC decision makers calculated that the best way to ensure long term stability in the region was to build up the Pashtun tribes in the south of Afghanistan. Such efforts would be supported by a bombing campaign of the Taliban's 'fixed military infrastructure'.


3) Emphasize Field Assessments

Consequences of Lack of Emphasis on Field Assessments

Taliban Relieved at Ineffectiveness of US Bombing Campaign

"Aref's men on the front lines...had intercepted tactical HF radio communications from Taliban positions, and these indicated a sense of relief among the Taliban forces at the low level and limited impact of the bombing." (Schroen 163) 

Time was on the Taliban's Side

“The only problem with his analysis then was that time was on the Taliban’s side. They had the ability to grow stronger, with support from their Arab friends and the Pakistanis.” (Schroen 203) 

Safety Issues

“The Taliban lines were at least five to six miles west of that location... We had sent the CIA and the CTC regular reporting on the construction of the new could the CIA not know about it? And worse, how could they not know where the front lines were located?" (Schroen 176)


3) Emphasize Field Assessments

Consequences of Lack of Emphasis on Field Assessments

Gary described the relief felt by Taliban troops that their front lines had not suffered more extensive damage as a result of the US bombing campaign.  Also, time spent building the Pashtun forces in the South would be used by Taliban leaders to regroup and rebuild.
    Safety issues were a major concern as the JAWBREAKER team's reports seemed to not have been read by those in headquarters. One instance in particular was when a predator drone nearly fired at two members of the JAWBREAKER team. The CIA operatives had gone to inspect an airstip located 5-6 miles away from Taliban lines. Such confusion should never have been possible as Mr. Schroen had clearly communicated the position of both allied and enemy positions.
    An ultimate consequence of the strategic decisions made between 9/11 and Tora Bora is that Osama bin Laden escaped capture for over a decade until he was finally located and eliminated by US Special forces in May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan. As of Oct 30, 2012, over 3,000 coalition forces have been killed in Afghanistan and the Taliban is still actively working against US interests.



Bernstein, Gary and Ralph Pezzullo. Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda New York: Random House, Inc. 2005.

Franks, Tommy. "War of Words." New York Times on the Web 19 Oct 2004.  

Osama bin Laden, qtd. by Raymond Ibrahim in The al-Qaeda Reader, 2007. pg. 245

Schroen, Gary C. First In. New York: Random House, Inc. 2005.

United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why That Matters Today. 111th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 2009.


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